与其他大型经济体相比，中国有更大的政策操作空间。力度适宜的财政举措既有利于短期的稳定，也有利于长期的繁荣。当然，单纯的刺激计划并不是万灵药。要说服怀疑论者，最好就是先有一个结构合理、目标明确的支出计划。在此基础上，还要采取进一步的努力来重新振兴“疫后时代”的经济，推行农村土地改革和进一步开放金融领域等措施——在不确定性日益增加的世界，这些仍是中国保持经济持续增长的关键。

　　6月2日，英国《金融时报》刊发京东集团副总裁、京东数科首席经济学家沈建光署名文章“China’s stimulus sceptics need not fear side-effects this time” ，译文《中国本轮刺激无需惧怕后遗症》刊发于6月4日《金融时报》中文网。

　　沈建光在文中提到，中国将致力于实现“六保”目标：保居民就业、保基本民生、保市场主体、保粮食能源安全、保产业链供应链稳定、保基层运转。例如，保护就业和中小企业就需要类似于“美国薪酬保护计划”（Paycheck Protection Program）这样的措施。建立更具韧性的供应链则意味着要增加基础设施支出。

　　以下为中文版《中国本轮刺激无需惧怕后遗症》

　　译者/何黎

　　在上个月召开的全国人民代表大会上，中国公布了一项备受期待的财政刺激方案，以应对新型冠状病毒肺炎（COVID-19，即2019冠状病毒病）危机对这个世界第二大经济体造成的负面影响。

　　此次抗疫支出的资金将来自发行抗疫特别国债、主要用于基础设施建设的地方政府专项债以及扩大财政赤字，政府总计新增举债3.6万亿元（合5000亿美元），约为中国经济年产值的4％。

　　在中国国内的许多人看来，这种干预很像2008年金融危机后中国政府推出的4万亿元人民币刺激计划。该刺激计划被视作有关超宽松财政政策风险的一次惨痛教训，自那以后成为经济辩论中的主要话题。但是这种“刺激恐惧症”从何而来？

　　金融危机时的刺激计划旨在提振低迷的需求，它包括大规模公共基础设施投资、社会福利支出和农村发展。诚然，它给中国留下了多年后才会感受到的许多后遗症，比如地方政府债务攀升、房地产泡沫积聚和大批僵尸企业等。人们担心最新的大规模支出会引发新一轮由债务驱动的泡沫，这是可以理解的。

　　不过事实也证明，2008年的刺激计划是果断而及时的，使中国经济走出了那一时期的困境。如果当时中国经济的结构性弊端能得到更好的解决，上述后遗症本可以控制。

　　当全世界正在遭受金融危机余波的冲击时，中国的政策制定者担忧危机会导致经济减速，这是完全正确的。几个月后中国的出口急转直下，失业率上升，大量中小企业倒闭。“四万亿”刺激让中国经济迅速恢复体能，并在随后的10年里超越了许多竞争对手。

　　公共支出不仅刺激了总需求，大规模基础设施投资的红利也逐渐显现。高铁、新机场和物流等基建——大多是在金融危机后建成的，一度被认为是不成熟的投资——塑造了中国的城市群，并提高了中国制造业的竞争力。根据我们对世界银行（World Bank）数据的分析，中国在全球制造业附加值中所占比重从2008年的14.4％上升至2018年的28.2％。

　　中国明白现在形势截然不同，比2008年还要更加紧迫。今年第一季度，随着抗疫工作持续，中国国内生产总值（GDP）下降6.8％，为有记录以来的最大降幅。相比之下，中国在2008年至2010年期间的经济增长低谷期，年增长率也有6.4％。

　　尽管4月份的经济数据显示出一些复苏迹象，但国内需求仍跟不上供应。虽然4月份规模以上工业增加值同比增长3.9％，但零售额和投资却出现收缩。而且，随着世界准备迎接一场严重的技术性衰退——其中，美国第二季度经济经通胀调整后折成年率下降38％——中国4月份出口的暂时性反弹掩盖了海外订单不断被取消的严峻现实。

　　中国政府承诺将致力于实现其所称的“六保”目标：保居民就业、保基本民生、保市场主体、保粮食能源安全、保产业链供应链稳定、保基层运转。例如，保护就业和中小企业就需要类似于“美国薪酬保护计划”（Paycheck Protection Program）这样的措施。建立更具韧性的供应链则意味着要增加基础设施支出。

　　与其他大型经济体相比，中国有更大的政策操作空间。根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的财政跟踪数据，截至今年4月，中国应对疫情影响的援助计划（包括支出、贷款和担保）仅相当于其GDP的2.5％，而德国为34％，日本为20.5％，美国为11.1％。即使加上在人大会议上宣布的举措，中国的财政支出承诺相比西方经济体仍有很大差距。

　　中国还拥有一批前景良好的新项目。当然，大部分财政支出将被用于落实“六保”，但人们也应关注那些“新基建”投资，例如数据中心、配备人工智能的工业设施以及冷链物流，所有这些项目都可能在未来10年内释放出中国作为经济强国的潜力。

　　力度适宜的财政举措既有利于短期的稳定，也有利于长期的繁荣。当然，单纯的刺激计划并不是万灵药。要说服怀疑论者，最好就是先有一个结构合理、目标明确的支出计划。在此基础上，还要采取进一步的努力来重新振兴“疫后时代”的经济，推行农村土地改革和进一步开放金融领域等措施——在不确定性日益增加的世界，这些仍是中国保持经济持续增长的关键。

　　以下为英文版《China’s stimulus sceptics need not fear side-effects this time》，2020年6月2日刊发于英国《金融时报》

　　At last month’s National People’s Congress， China unveiled a much-anticipated fiscal stimulus package to counter the damage caused by the Covid-19 crisis to the world’s second-biggest economy.

　　The virus-fighting spend， which amounts to an extra Rmb3.6tn （$500bn）， or around 4 per cent of China’s annual economic output， will be paid for by the issue of special Treasury bonds for pandemic relief， as well as infrastructure-bound local government special bonds and a wider fiscal deficit.

　　For many in China， the intervention is reminiscent of the Rmb4tn stimulus introduced by Beijing after the 2008 financial crisis. Held up as a painful lesson on the risks of ultra-loose fiscal policy， it has since dominated economic debate. But where does this stimulus phobia come from？

　　Aimed at boosting sagging demand， the financial crisis-era programme involved massive public infrastructure investment， social welfare spending and rural development. True， it left China with a painful legacy that was felt many years later， such as bloated local government debt， a red-hot housing market and hordes of zombie companies. People understandably fear a new debt-fuelled bubble from the latest spending spree.

　　However， the 2008 stimulus package also proved to be a strong and timely relief from the maladies of the period. The side-effects would have been held in check if the structural flaws in China’s economy had been better addressed.

　　When the world was reeling from the aftermath of the financial crisis， China’s policymakers were absolutely right to worry about the downturn it would cause. Months later， the country’s exports would drop， unemployment rose and many small businesses collapsed. Stimulus enabled China to quickly restore its economic vigour and the country went on to overtake many of its rivals in the ensuing decade.

　　The public expenditure did not just prop up aggregate demand； in particular， huge spending on infrastructure has paid off. A high-speed railway network， new airports and logistics — mostly built after the crisis and once deemed as being premature investments — have shaped the country’s urban clusters and made its manufacturing sector more competitive. China’s share of the global manufacturing sector’s value-added rose from 14.4 per cent in 2008 to 28.2 per cent in 2018, according to our analysis of World Bank data.

　　China now finds itself in a completely different landscape. The current situation calls for even greater urgency than 2008. As the battle against Covid-19 dragged on， China’s GDP shrank 6.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2020, the steepest year-on-year fall ever recorded. By contrast， the country’s economic trough between 2008 and 2010 was a 6.4 per cent year-on-year expansion.

　　Although April’s data contained some green shoots， domestic demand lagged behind supply. While the added value of industrial production grew 3.9 per cent， retail sales and investment contracted. And as the world braces itself for a sharp technical recession， with the US economy heading for a 38 per cent annualised decline in inflation-adjusted output in the second quarter， a temporary rebound in China’s exports in April disguised the grim reality that more and more foreign orders were being cancelled.

　　Beijing has vowed to work on what it calls its “six priorities”: employment， basic livelihood， companies， food and energy security， stable supply chains and smooth operation of government. For example， saving jobs and small and medium-sized businesses would call for something similar to the US’s Paycheck Protection Program. A more resilient supply chain suggests increased infrastructure spending.

　　China has more room for manoeuvre than other big economies. According to IMF’s fiscal tracker， China’s Covid-19 support packages （including spending， loans and guarantees） amounted to only 2.5 per cent of its gross domestic product by April， compared to 34 per cent for Germany， 20.5 per cent for Japan and 11.1 per cent for the US. Even after adding the measures announced at the NPC， China’s fiscal commitment is still a far cry from that of western economies.

　　The country also boasts a fresh and promising pool of projects. Of course， much of the fiscal spending will be earmarked for the six priorities， but the spotlight should also be turned on those “new infrastructure” investments such as data centres， industrial facilities powered by artificial intelligence and cold-chain logistics for products such as frozen goods， all of which could unleash China’s potential as an economic powerhouse over the next decade.

　　A healthy dose of fiscal action serves both shorter-term stability and longer-term prosperity. Of course， stimulus alone is no panacea. The best way to overcome the sceptics is to build on a well-structured and carefully targeted spending plan. Further efforts to rejuvenate the post-pandemic economy — through measures such as rural land reform and a further opening-up of the financial sector — remain key to China’s sustained growth in an increasingly uncertain world.